In modern businesses, firms face new challenges of managerial retention in capital budgeting process. We consider a model in which a manager privately observes the capital productivity of a project and has access to multiple outside financing options. We show that if the manager can obtain funding from either internal or external capital (but not both), the firm may exclude highly profitable investment projects but fund those projects that have moderate capital productivity, even when there is no limit on capital allocation. Furthermore, the firm may voluntarily impose capital rationing in order to keep the projects within the firm, even though it has sufficient capital to fund such profitable projects. However, if the firm can utilize both the internal and external capital, highly profitable projects are always retained and the voluntary capital rationing is not optimal. Our analysis identifies testable empirical predictions on the association between capital budgeting and external capital.
Introduction
Capital allocation decisions are one of the most influential decisions in a firm's long-term financial health (Baldwin and Clark (1992) and Porter (1992) ). Theory indicates that with a goal of maximizing its shareholders' value, a firm accepts all profitable projects and provide sufficient capital to utilize this opportunity. In practice, firms often operate under a capital constraint even though they have sufficient capital to fund all profitable projects. This capital rationing process -allocating a limited amount of capital to profitable capital budgeting projects -has been widely adopted in * We thank Ramji Balakrishnan (the Editor), Thomas Hemmer (the Associate Editor), and the reviewers for very constructive and insightful suggestions that significantly improved the quality of the paper. All remaining errors are our own.
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various firms across different industries. In a survey by Mukherjee and Hingorani (1999) , 64% of Fortune 500 firms in their sample frequently place a quantity limit on the internal capital available for investment plans. Of those firms that adopt capital rationing, 82% indicate that such rationing is made internally by executive managers rather than by external lenders. Senior managers argue that capital rationing is not irrational behavior but is instead a reaction to real problems. In particular, survey evidence shows that the main reason for capital rationing is the reluctance to borrow the external capital. This finding is puzzling, because if the expected project return is sufficiently high, then theoretically firms should still fund profitable projects by utilizing the external capital.
In this paper, we articulate potential economic consequences of utilizing external capital, thereby resolving the aforementioned capital rationing phenomenon. Intuitively, external capital allows a firm to exploit more growth opportunities when internal funds are insufficient (Gutmann (1967) ). However, the speed of technological change in recent years has increased both the importance and the difficulty of retaining managerial expertise. Now, it is the managers who identify profitable projects, propose necessary financial resources, and attract talents to execute the projects. Managers can easily walk away with their information and knowledge innovations and seek for funding with other employers or venture capitalists. Indeed, Gertner et al. (1994) points out that utilizing external capital may affect the residual rights of control over firms' assets like intellectual capital, and consequently the choice of these capital resources has first-order real effects on managers' incentives. (Also see similar arguments by Dutta (2003) and the references therein).
Thus, when making capital-budgeting decisions that involves external capital, firms need to consider an economic trade-off between the exploitation of growth opportunities and potential cost of managerial retention and losing residual rights.
We construct a principal-agent model in which an owner (principal) contracts with a manager (agent). The manager privately observes the capital productivity of an investment project and seeks to fund the project. The manager may request capital funding either from the owner or from an external market. When the project's capital productivity increases, the owner can realize higher investment return, but the manager can also attract higher external capital. Through this framework, we intend to address the following research questions: What are the factors that deter firms from simply utilizing external capital and matching managers' outside opportunities? How should firms design capital budgeting mechanism in the presence of such a retention problem?
Could firms endogenize the external capital obtained by managers?
We consider two scenarios in order to illustrate the effect of external capital. First, we consider the scenario in which the owner will lose the whole residual right of the investment project when the project is funded by the external capital. That is, if the manager (professor, product developer, or software designer), chooses to fund the project via external capital, she will walk away with relevant intellectual capital such as patents and the owner will not retain any investment return from the project. This scenario is labelled as exclusive capital budgeting. Indeed, Bhide (2000) reports that founders of more than 70 percent of the Inc. 500 firms admitted that they developed and marketed ideas identified in their previous employment. Ittner et al. (2003) also argue that managerial retention becomes a more important issue when managers can walk away with information and technology. In the second scenario, the capital allocation may utilize a mix of both internal and external capital. We label this alternative scenario as centralized capital budgeting, because the owner here still retains partial residual right of the project, albeit funded by external capital. One possible example of this setting is that the owner may have a joint venture with external capital that the manager might obtain externally, thereby endogenizing the manager's external opportunities.
In the first scenario, since the owner does not observe the capital productivity, it offers the manager a menu of contracts. If the manager chooses to fund the project internally, the owner funds the project via internal capital and requests a repayment from the manager after the fact. However, if the manager opts for external capital, the owner must forgo this investment opportunity. The owner here faces an economic trade-off. On the one hand, in order to retain the manager, the owner must provide sufficient internal capital to match the manager's external opportunities or reservation utility. On the other hand, since the owner cannot observe the capital productivity, it must design the menu appropriately to eliminate the manager's incentive to overstate his capital productivity.
To reduce this incentive for misreporting, the owner must pay the manager information rent, which consequently reduces the owner's investment return from the project.
In this exclusive capital budgeting case, we demonstrate that the owner may forgo highly profitable projects but fund those projects that have moderate capital productivity (cf. Antle and Eppen (1985) and Dutta (2003) ). Counterintuitive as it sounds, this result is actually quite natural. When the manager has high capital productivity, his external opportunity (reservation utility) is also high. Thus, if the owner would like to match the manager's outside opportunity, it inevitably has to reduce the repayment significantly. But a lower repayment may induce the inefficient manager to mimic the efficient one. As the owner is unable to observe the manager's true capital productivity, the owner might further reduce the lower-type manager's capital allocation and repayment to prohibit this temptation, but this will make the owner's investment return significantly lower. Thus the owner may choose to forgo these highly profitable projects in order to balance between ex post investment efficiency and ex ante incentive compatibility.
Furthermore, our analysis also predicts that the firm may voluntarily impose capital rationing, even though it has sufficient capital to fund such profitable projects. This strategy provides appropriate incentives for the manager to voluntarily disclose the profitability of the project and at the same time optimally balances the economic trade-off between retaining the project and matching with the manager's external opportunity. This result may help explain an empirical puzzle in which many firms voluntarily impose a quantity limit on capital spending, even though they have suffi-cient capital to fund such profitable projects. Thus, our analysis documents that the availability of external capital may give rise to severe inefficiencies in capital budgeting process. Namely, the firm may forgo highly profitable projects and impose capital rationing on profitable projects. Our results may shed some light on the economic rationale of this market phenomenon.
In the second scenario, the capital allocation may utilize a mix of both internal and external capital. We find that (internal) voluntary capital rationing is never optimal, and the owner never forgoes any highly profitable projects. Further, the owner may utilize external capital as an additional tool to reduce the information rent paid for the manager. The optimal incentive plan stipulates a mix of internal and external capital; it balances the cost of capital, the cost of inducing the manager's truthful report, and the capital return from the investment project. We find that the optimal amount of external capital increases in the manager's capital productivity; however, because of the information asymmetry, the owner always distorts the allocation of external capital in order to limit the manager's information rent. In this sense, the inability of retaining the high-type manager as well as the voluntary capital rationing vanish if the firm could have a better control over its financing policies.
The extant literature (e.g., Antle and Eppen (1985) and Dutta (2003) ) has shown that the firm may offer second-best capital allocation (or impose a higher hurdle rate) in the presence of information asymmetry. Capital is rationed because the allocation is lower than the first-best level. 1 But, it is never optimal to forgo profitable investment projects (after being adjusted for information rent) in these models. Specifically, we document two new findings that are absent in the extant literature. First, in the same setting as in Antle and Eppen (1985) , we show that the firm may voluntarily impose capital rationing (not allocate the maximum capital) because of the presence of external capital. Moreover, the firm may forgo highly profitable projects but fund only those projects that have moderate capital productivity. Second, if the firm can still retain partial residual right of the project, albeit funded by external capital, such capital rationing for highly profitable projects can never be optimal. In fact, external capital can serve as an additional screening tool to reduce the information rent paid to the manager. Taken together, our analysis provides an economic rationale for capital rationing -firms may forgo highly profitable projects only if utilizing external capital may lead to the loss of residual right of the investment projects.
Conventional accounting wisdom argues that a firm has no benefit to reject a profitable project when there is sufficient capital to utilize this opportunity. However, Mukherjee and Hingorani (1999) shows that 64% of Fortune 500 firms in their sample frequently place a quantity limit on the internal capital available for investment plans. Capital rationing receives little attention despite its prevalence in practice. In a multi-divisional setting, Balakrishnan (1995) shows that an owner may find it optimal to ration capacity allocation when divisions claim low realizations of productivity.
1 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to us. Zhang (1997) and Paik and Sen (1995) demonstrate that when the manager's effort and capital are substitutes, capital rationing should be adopted because of the moral hazard associated with the unobservable effort. In this paper, we show that capital rationing may result from the economic loss of external financing.
Optimal capital budgeting mechanisms are also investigated in the accounting literature. Most papers, stemming from Antle and Eppen (1985) , focus on identifying the means by which inefficiencies in capital allocation can be mitigated, such as the power of commitment in a repeated problem in Antle and Fellingham (1997) , the introduction and design of information systems in Antle et al. (2001) and Arya et al. (2000) . Balakrishnan (1991) shows that how information acquisition may affect the resource allocation decisions in the presence of information asymmetry. Another stream of research examines the reduction in inefficiency by restructuring the resource allocation. Interestingly, Balakrishnan (1993) demonstrate that given a common resource, an owner may benefit from fixed cost allocations not only from inducing optimal utilization of available capacity but in deciding how much capacity to acquire. Antle et al. (1999) and Arya and Glover (2001) show how bundling projects and considering them simultaneously can ease incentive problems. In contrast,
we do not propose a way to mitigate asymmetric information, but instead focus on analyzing the effect of external capital on existing capital budgeting mechanisms.
In terms of modelling, this paper is related to the principal-agent problems in which the agent's reservation utility is type-dependent as in Jullien (2000) and Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1995) .
Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1995) consider a regulation scenario in which a principal does not observe the agent's private cost information and the agent has access to outside options. Jullien (2000) investigates a rather general and abstract setting in which outside options could refer to the available alternatives or could arise as a form of competition. In a similar vein, Dutta (2008) characterizes optimal pay-performance sensitivities of compensation contracts when a manager has outside employment opportunities correlated with his private information. However, these papers do not consider the possibility of allowing the agent to use both inside and outside options. We illustrate that the availability of external capital may naturally give rise to nonlinear reservation utility, which consequently results in very special incentive plans for managerial retention. In this regard, our analysis complements that of Dutta (2008) , where reservation utility is assumed to be linear in the agent's private information.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the economic setting.
Section 3 examines capital allocation under exclusive capital budgeting. Section 4 investigates the centralized capital budgeting scenario. Section 5 provides an explanation for voluntary capital rationing. Section 6 concludes. All the proofs are in the appendix.
Model
We consider a principal-agent model in which a firm's risk-neutral owner (principal) contracts with its risk-neutral manager (agent). The manager owns an investment project, privately observes its marginal capital productivity (denoted by θ > 0), and may request capital funding either from the owner or from an external market. The owner has access to the maximum internal capital K and incurs a cost rI if it allocates capital I to the manager, where r is the cost of internal capital. The owner's prior belief of θ is represented by the distribution function F (θ), with f (θ) being its density function and a monotone hazard rate:
As a departure from the existing literature, the manager can access internal and external financing where multiple options are available. Each outside financing option is specified by a pair (1990)). Specifically, we assume the investment returns from external capital are given by ρθe, where ρ < 1 represents the extent to which potential agency conflict may affect the efficiency of external capital. Thus, the manager's net payoff from external capital is represented by ρθe − c(e). In the university-professor example, (e, c(e)) may correspond to how costly for the professor to get his project funded via an alternative institution outside the university. Note that from this representation, the larger the parameter ρ, the smaller the agency cost associated with external capital and the more efficient external capital. As an extreme example, when ρ = 0, the outside option degenerates and the capital allocation is determined a la Antle and Eppen (1985) . 2 We now derive the manager's "reservation utility," which is defined as the maximum payoff that he obtains from the available outside options. Suppose that the manager's type is θ. After self-selecting his favorite external capital option e, the manager obtains the value of external capital
where the maximum is assumed to exist (otherwise the manager would obtain an unbounded reservation payoff). The following lemma establishes the structural properties of E(θ).
Lemma 1. E(θ) is increasingly convex in θ, and E(0) = 0.
We make two points from Lemma 1. First, in the presence of external capital, the manager is better off exploiting investment opportunities outside the firm. Second, as the manager's capital productivity is higher, the investment project is more valuable, and thus he will find it increasingly more attractive to utilize external capital. These two reasons therefore suggest that the manager's outside opportunity is a convex function of his type. That is, a manager with higher marginal capital productivity also possesses higher reservation utility and that the marginal value of utilizing external capital increases in the capital productivity of the manager's investment project. 3
In what follows, we consider two different scenarios to capture the economic effects of external financing: 1) Exclusive capital budgeting: the investment project can be funded through either internal or external capital (not both), and the funding source is at the manager's discretion.
2) Centralized capital budgeting: the owner has full control rights over capital allocation both internally and externally; thus, the amounts of internal capital and external capital are chosen by the owner as a bundle and the manager must follow this decision.
Exclusive Capital Budgeting
In this section, we investigate a situation in which investment projects can be financed through either internal capital or external capital, but not both. In particular, if the manager, (university professor, product developer and software designer), chooses to fund the project via external capital, he will walk away with relevant intellectual capital such as patents and the owner will not retain any investment return from the project.
Let us start with the description of the incentive plans. The available menu specifies {(I e , t e (I e )},
where I e is the internal capital and t e (I e ) is the corresponding repayment that the manager needs to return to the owner. By the Revelation Principle, we can further replace the above menu by the incentive plans {(I e (θ), t e (θ))}, where I e (θ) is the internal capital intended for type-θ manager 3 It is worth emphasizing that one cannot directly apply the approach by Jullien (2000) to this capital rationing context. A crucial assumption in Jullien (2000) is the strict quasi-concavity of the "virtual surplus." In our context this assumption requires that the function θI +
I be strictly quasi-concave for all γ ∈ [0, 1]. One can easily verify that this condition cannot be satisfied universally in our context. Consider for example that θ is uniformly distributed over [0, 1] . The assumption of quasi-concavity requires that
However, for every θ ∈ [0,
], we can find γ = 2θ such that the above inequality fails. Thus, we need to consider an alternative approach tailored to our specific context in order to characterize the optimal incentive plan.
and t e (θ) is the corresponding repayment. The sequence of events is as follows. 1) The manager observes capital productivity of the investment project.
2) The owner announces the menu of incentive plans to the manager.
3) The manager selects an incentive plan and determines the amount of external capital if he is delegated to do so. 4) The investment return is realized, and the owner then obtains the promised repayment from the manager.
To derive the optimal menu of incentive plans, we first characterize the manager's payoff upon accepting a specific plan. A manager with capital productivity θ may pretend to be typeθ and choose the incentive plan (I e (θ), t e (θ)). In this case, the manager's utility function is given by
In contrast, if a type-θ manager opts to not receive any internal capital, he should adopt the most profitable outside option and obtain E(θ). We use the following notation to characterize the manager's utility. Let M e ⊆ [θ, θ] be the set of capital productivity in which the project is funded by internal capital, and [θ, θ] \ M e is the set of capital productivity in which the manager opts out for external capital. Furthermore, let U e (θ) ≡ U e (θ, θ) represent the manager's utility under truthful reporting. Under truth-telling of the manager, the optimal mechanism for the owner solves the following problem:
where the incentive compatibility ensures that the manager will truthfully report his capital productivity θ and the individual rationality constraint guarantees that the manager participates.
We now characterize the optimal incentive plans. When external capital is accessible to the manager, the owner has to make two kinds of strategic decisions. First, how should the owner select the investment project funded by internal capital? That is, how should the owner select the appropriate set M e ? Second, provided that the set M e is determined, how should the owner determine the amount of internal capital for the manager, knowing that he has private information about capital productivity of the investment project? We start with explaining the owner's economic trade-off between funding the investment project via internal capital or relinquishing it to external capital. In order to retain the manager, the owner must provide sufficient internal capital to match with his external opportunities or his reservation utility (i.e., U e (θ) ≥ E(θ)). Thus, the presence of external capital reduces the owner's net payoff. On the other hand, since the owner cannot observe how profitable the project is, the owner needs to design appropriate incentive plans to eliminate the manager's incentive to overstate the capital productivity and raise more internal capital. The solution to this problem exhibits four regimes and is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 . In the graph, the solid line denotes the manager's utility from internal capital U e (θ) whereas the dotted line is his utility from external capital E(θ). In the following we elaborate in detail on the optimal incentive plans, the manager's utility, and the owner's incentive. In the regime θ ∈ [τ, β] , the manager's utility from internal capital is larger than that from external capital. When the manager's capital productivity is larger than the hurdle rate τ , the owner allocates the maximum internal capital K to all types of managers above this cutoff level.
The common capital K implies that the requested repayment, t e , from the manager has to be identical. The manager obtains a positive utility (i.e., information rent) in this regime, and his utility is increasing in the capital productivity. Since the manager's utility is larger than his external opportunities, the optimal internal capital allocation is not affected by this second-best contract;
consequently, we obtain similar results as in Antle and Eppen (1985) .
In the regime θ ∈ [θ * * , τ ), voluntary capital rationing may emerge endogenously as the optimal capital allocation. In this case, the manager's utility from internal capital is matched with that from external capital. To understand the intuition, consider the manager whose type is slightly lower than τ . The owner intends to keep projects with lower capital productivity, but is still profitable from the owner's perspective. Because the internal capital allocation is at the maximum level at θ = τ , the remaining tool is to lower internal capital allocation and charge a lower repayment less efficient managers θ ∈ [θ * * , τ ). This allocation serves two purposes: 1) it ensures that the manager receives his reservation utility; and 2) it also ensures that the manager with the highest capital productivity, who originally chooses the maximum internal capital, will not deviate to select the lower capital instead. The optimal internal capital is distorted from the maximum internal capital K; thus, in the regime of [θ * * , τ ), voluntary capital rationing emerges as an optimal solution to keep the profitable projects.
These results are consistent with Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1995) . When the managers have type-dependent reservation utilities, the optimal capital is driven by two factors separately: in one region, the capital is driven entirely by the local incentive compatibility, i.e., the "second-best" solution (which is K in our context from Antle and Eppen (1985) ); in the other region, the optimal capital is designed such that the manager's reservation utility is matched. Thus, naturally there are two regimes as specified in our solution. The question is whether the owner wants to give the second-best solution (K) to the relatively high types or relatively low types. Obviously, distorting the relatively low types results in a lower deadweight loss, because the low-type manager's capital productivity is lower. Given that, the owner should match the reservation utilities of the relatively low types, rather than distorting the relatively high types. This explains why the maximum capital is offered to the relatively high types θ ∈ [τ, β] while quantity rationing is given to less efficient managers θ ∈ [θ * * , τ ). The optimal value of τ balances this trade-off: when the owner increases τ , it gains from extracting the surplus (information rent) from more types of managers, but at the same time suffers from the inefficiency of offering lower capital to less efficient managers.
Surprisingly, the owner turns down the investment project when the manager is not only with relatively low capital productivity θ ∈ [0, θ * * ), but also with relatively high capital productivity θ ∈ (β,θ]. Counterintuitive as it sounds, that the owner may forgo highly profitable projects in the presence of outside options is actually quite natural. When the manager has very high capital productivity, his reservation utility is also high. Thus, if the owner matches the manager's outside opportunity with internal capital, it inevitably has to reduce the repayment significantly, for the internal allocation is already capped by the maximum level K. Nevertheless, this may induce the managers that have a relatively lower capital productivity to choose these incentive plans intended for the higher-type manager, which forces the owner to forgo highly profitable investment projects.
It is worth emphasizing that this cut-off point θ * * is different from the hurdle rate in Antle and Eppen (1985) : There, the owner discards the projects with capital productivity less then θ * , the unique solution that solves θ * = r + H(θ * ). In contrast with θ * , the threshold here θ * * is affected by the transaction cost ρ. This implies that the inefficiency that arises from using external capital also affects the required rate of return for the internal capital. This is because the owner finds it optimal to design the internal incentive plans for the manager with relatively low capital productivity in order to match his reservation utility, and consequently the economic trade-off is altered due to the existence of external capital. Therefore, we have identified a previously ignored interplay between the inefficiency of external capital and the internal incentive plan. Incidentally, when θ * * ≥θ, if the owner insists on using capital rationing plan, the firm has to abandon all the investment projects in order to avoid the manager from misreporting his capital productivity. This is not a preferred solution, because the owner cannot materialize any investment opportunity due to the severe cannibalization problem. In this case, the owner would rather offer a single incentive plan with an appropriately designed hurdle rate as suggested by Antle and Eppen (1985) , as this single incentive plan avoids the sophisticated self-selection behavior from the manager. On the other hand, if the size of internal capital is relatively small (that is, K ≤ E ′ (θ * * )), the owner cannot pool enough resources internally to match the manager's benefit from external capital. Thus, the owner is forced to provide the maximum internal capital once the manager's investment project gets approved. 4
Centralized Capital Budgeting
We have documented that when the owner forces the manager to use either the internal capital or external capital, the capital allocation is highly inefficient because 1) the manager with high capital productivity may be turned down; and 2) even if the investment project is funded by the owner, the manager may still suffer from voluntary capital rationing. A natural question is whether the owner can achieve a higher payoff by utilizing both the internal and external capitals. One possible example of this setting is that the owner may have a joint venture with external capital that the manager might obtain externally, thereby endogenizing the manager's external opportunities.
In light of this practice, we investigate the scenario in which the owner may monitor both the internal and external capital. This scenario is labelled as the centralized capital budgeting, because it allows the owner to retain partial residual right of the project and endogenizes the manager's outside opportunities. We consider a centralized capital budgeting setting in which the manager reports his private information to the owner, who then decides amount of capital allocation by utilizing a mix of internal and external capital. This arrangement represents the typical capital budgeting process within a centralized firm in which the owner makes the capital investment decisions based on the divisional managers' proposals.
In such a scenario, because the project is still partially funded by the firm, the principal (owner)
can observe the actual amount of external capital borrowed by the manager. Conceptually, one can imagine that the owner specifies a menu of incentive plans that indicate internal capital and how the firm will match the external capital that the manager brings in from outside sources. To overcome the asymmetric information problem vis-a-vis the manager, the owner offers a menu of incentive plans to the manager. This menu of incentive plans is specified as (k c (θ), I c (θ), t c (θ)) where
is the total capital intended for the type-θ manager to use for the investment project from both internally (I c (θ)) and externally (e c (θ)), and t c (θ) is the corresponding repayment.
The owner provides only I c (θ) to the manager for implementing his investment project, and the manager needs to borrow e c (θ) from an external market. We assume that the cost of external capital is increasingly convex in the amount of the external capital e, that is, c ′ (e) > 0, and c ′′ (e) > 0.
We now characterize the optimal incentive plans under centralized capital budgeting. If a type-θ manager reports to be type-θ, the owner shall select the incentive plans I c (θ), e c (θ), and t c (θ) for him. Thus, the expected utility of the manager is given by
Note that as long as the manager individual rationality constraint is satisfied, the owner can make the required repayment to the owner, t c (θ), contingent on both internal and external capital. Define
as the equilibrium payoff received by the type-θ manager. We can write down the owner's optimization problem as follows:
where the two inequalities are respectively the incentive compatibility and the individual rationality constraint. The optimal incentive plans can then be characterized as follows. budgeting is identical to that in Antle and Eppen (1985) , and voluntary capital rationing as documented in Proposition 1 disappears. When the owner makes the investment decision, he simply allocates the maximum internal capital K whenever the manager's capital productivity is larger than the hurdle rate (θ ≥ θ * ). Now the owner has two contracting parameters: k c (θ) and I c (θ).
Consequently, the owner finds it optimal to offer the manager the efficient internal capital K, but screen the manager with different capital productivity by requesting for different amounts of external capital. We also find that the owner now distorts downwards the allocation for external capital in order to reflect the cost of inducing the manager to report truthfully. Thus, when the manager has incentives to under-report capital productivity, the owner faces a trade-off between inducing the manager's truthful report and achieving the ex post investment efficiency.
Proposition 2 shows that the owner allocates a positive amount of external capital if and only if capital productivity is larger than a threshold θ c > 0. This implies that the hurdle rate rationing introduced in Antle and Eppen (1985) appears in the allocation of external capital when centralized capital budgeting is invoked. This hurdle rate decreases when the efficiency of external capital is improved, i.e., dθ c /dρ < 0, because the owner expects to receive higher return from the investment project.Finally, the optimal incentive plan stipulates a mix of internal and external capital, and balances the cost of capital, the cost of inducing the manager's truthful report, and the capital return from the investment project. For example, when external capital is as efficient as internal capital (ρ = 1), the owner simply compares the marginal costs between two sources of capital. If there is a cap on the amount of total investment in the project, the owner then would prefer to borrow from the source of capital that is of lower marginal capital costs. correspond to the hurdle rates of ρ H and ρ L , respectively. First, when external capital is relatively efficient (ρ > ρ c ), the hurdle rate for external capital is lower than that for internal capital θ * .
In this case, the investment projects with relatively lower capital productivity θ ∈ [θ c , θ * ] will be funded solely by external capital rather than internal capital. But the investment projects with higher capital productivity θ ∈ [θ * , θ] will be funded both the maximum internal capital K and external capital e c .
Second, when the efficiency of external capital is low (ρ < ρ c ), the owner may fund the investment project only by internal capital and no external capital is utilized unless capital productivity is high enough. As external capital becomes very inefficient, the capital allocation in our setting resembles that in Antle and Eppen (1985) . Third, when external capital becomes more efficient (ρ increases), the hurdle rate for external capital θ c is lower and the total capital allocation k c is
higher. This relation is demonstrated by the dotted line in the figure in which ρ H indicates the case of relatively higher efficiency of external capital. Taken together, these results predict that there may exist a pecking order, as a function of the efficiency of external capital, for capital allocation in capital budgeting.
Discussions and Extensions
In this section, we first articulate the difference between our basic model (the exclusive capital budgeting scenario) with the existing literature. Following this, we evaluate whether the aforementioned inefficiencies can be eliminated under an alternative financing policy.
5 When the efficiency of external capital is very high ρ > 1, the hurdle rate θ c is lower, deviating further from θ * and the external capital ec is higher. In the extreme case, the owner would never discard the projects (θ c ≤ θ), because he can always subsidize the inefficiency of internal capital by highly efficient external capital. We thank an anonymous referee for this insight.
Voluntary Capital Rationing
Why doesn't voluntary capital rationing on highly profitable projects emerge as the optimal solution in the earlier literature such as Antle and Eppen (1985) and Dutta (2003) ? In their models, the owner allocates the maximum (zero) capital when the capital productivity is above (below) than the hurdle rate. In this case, the owner must set the repayment such that the cutoff type of manager receives just his reservation utility. The question arising from this setting is whether the owner may gain from retaining lower-type managers by offering them lower capital allocation. Antle and Eppen (1985) assume that all types of managers have an identical reservation utility (normalized to zero) and thus the owner does not gain from retaining lower-type manager. Dutta (2003) assumes that the manager's reservation utility increases linearly in the manager's types.
Under this assumption, the owner finds that the loss from matching the lower-type manager's outside opportunities is larger than the gain from employing lower-type mangers. Consequently, when the managers' reservation utilities are sufficiently homogeneous as in Antle and Eppen (1985) and Dutta (2003) , it is suboptimal to offer any additional incentive plan for lower-type managers.
In contrast, our model assumes that the manager has multiple investment opportunities available from external capital. As shown in Lemma 1, this assumption implies that the manager's reservation utility is a convex function of her capital productivity; the marginal increase of the manager's reservation utility decreases as the manager's capital productivity decreases. The owner again faces the same trade-off between retaining less efficient managers and matching their outside opportunities. Nevertheless, provided that the manager's reservation utility decreases at a faster rate than his capital productivity, the owner now finds it optimal to retain less efficient managers.
In the meantime, the owner sets a relatively high repayment for this new plan (but still lower than the repayment for the original plan). Because this repayment is relatively high, if those managers who originally choose the maximum capital select the new plan instead, they would obtain a lower payoff than their original ones. Therefore, the owner is able to offer multiple allocation plans to the manager while still maintaining the incentive compatibility. 6
Opportunity Cost of Quitting
What is the role of an opportunity cost of quitting in the contracting relationship? 7 To explore this issue, let us assume that when the owner decides to exclude the manager, he has to incur an opportunity cost C o ≥ 0. This quitting cost may be lower for an established firm but higher for a startup. In contrast, the manager's opportunity cost of quitting is C m + κθ, where C m represents a common fixed cost and κ ≥ 0 is the time value of searching for external capital. This implies that an efficient manager will find it more costly to leave the firm and find a new source of capital externally. As a result, the owner reduces the hurdle rate and the project is more likely to be funded by internal capital. The following proposition characterizes how the hurdle rate θ * * changes in response to these opportunity costs. 8
Proposition 3. The hurdle rate θ * * is decreasing in C o , C m , and κ.
The above proposition has an intuitive interpretation. As either the owner or the manager incur a higher opportunity cost, it is relatively more profitable to fund the project. Consequently, the owner intends to exclude fewer types of managers. An empirical implication is that compared with an established firm, a startup firm is more likely to set a lower hurdle rate and to retain the manager, as the opportunity cost of quitting is higher for the startup firm.
Conclusion
In this paper, we argue that the owner will lose the whole residual right of the investment project when the project is funded by the external capital. To avoid potential economic loss, the investment projects can be financed through either internal capital or external capital, but not both.
We show that under this exclusive capital budgeting scenario, the firm may forgo highly profitable and each individual supplier i offers a menu { (ei(θ), ci(ei(θ) ))} to the manager. In this case, what really matters to the manager is the collective menu available to her rather than each individual contract. Thus, we could conveniently ..., {(en(θ), cn(en(θ) ))} from all external capital suppliers as the collection (combination) of these n menus {(e(θ), c(e(θ)))}. Thus, our model could be interpreted as if the owner (the internal capital supplier) designs the menu {(Ie(θ), te(θ))} for the privately-informed manager, while facing the threat of multiple external capital suppliers. From the firm's perspective, the threat is summarized by the available options offered to the manager {(e, c(e))}. 7 We thank an anonymous referee for inspiring this extension. 8 We also introduce the personal risk for the manager to join the external party (mean variance specification).
However, because both the owner and the entrepreneur are risk-neutral, the main economic trade-offs are not sensitive to this assumption.
projects but fund those projects that have moderate capital productivity. Furthermore, the firm may voluntarily impose capital rationing, even though it has sufficient capital to fund such profitable projects. This solution mainly results from the economic trade-off between matching with the manager's external opportunities and inducing the manager's truthful telling. This result provides another theoretical explanation for voluntary capital rationing we observe in practice. Under centralized capital budgeting, losing residual right of the project is not a concern for the owner. We show that if the owner can incorporate external capital in the contract with the manager, highly profitable projects are funded by the firm and the capital rationing for highly profitable projects is no longer optimal. The optimal amount of external capital increases in the manager's capital productivity; however, because of the information asymmetry, the owner always distorts the allocation of external capital in order to limit the manager's information rent. Our analysis highlights the role of external capital in capital budgeting process and identifies opportunities for managers to enhance firm profitability through employing external capital.
The study can be extended into several directions. One may extend our analysis into the setting in which the owner oversees multiple internal divisions. In this case, the allocation mechanism within a firm cannot leave managers' outside opportunities aside, and sometimes it might be profitable to "subsidize" less efficient divisions more internal capital and retain more profitable projects within a firm. This remains a research priority. Another possible direction is to study the the interaction between external capital and internal capital. If the investment project could result in negative profits with some probability, thereby triggering a binding debt covenant, the owner may have a stronger incentive to utilize internal capital than external capital. In such a scenario, the interaction between external capital and internal capital may come into play. Finally, a simple "type-dependent" agency model will not suffice to fully address the issues related to managerial retention. Many important aspects in labor markets (such as managerial recruiting, sorting, training, and promotion) are inevitably intertwined with managerial retention. An important topic for future research would be to build a multi-period model in which the managerial retention decision is dynamically affected by these aspects (see, e.g., Lazear and Oyer (2004) ).
Appendix. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider two types θ 1 and θ 2 . Assume that the maximizer for type-θ 1 manager is e 1 ≥ 0, i.e., r(θ 1 ) = ρθ 1 e 1 − c(e 1 ). We have
{ρθ 2 e − c(e)} ≥ ρθ 2 e 1 − c(e 1 ) = ρθ 1 e 1 − c(e 1 ) + ρe 1 (θ 2 − θ 1 ) = E(θ 1 ) + ρe 1 (θ 2 − θ 1 ),
and therefore E(θ 2 ) ≥ E(θ 1 )+ρe 1 (θ 2 −θ 1 ), ∀θ 1 , θ 2 . Note that the above inequality holds for arbitrary pair of types θ 1 and θ 2 . Thus, E(θ) is convex in θ. To prove the monotonicity of E(θ), consider a pair (θ 1 , θ 2 ) and without loss of generality we assume θ 1 ≤ θ 2 . The optimality condition leads to
where the last inequality follows from e 1 being nonnegative. Therefore, E(θ) is increasing. Finally,
Proof of Proposition 1. Following the approach established in Jullien (2000), we can restrict our attention to the case in which the owner offers internal incentive plans to only the manager whose capital productivity falls into an interval. Therefore, we will assume that 1) The owner offers a menu of incentive plans to the manager with θ ∈ [α, τ ); 2) The manager with θ ∈ [τ, β] accepts the same internal incentive plan with the maximum capital, K, and an associated promised return t e (τ ), regardless of his capital productivity,; 3) The manager with capital productivity that falls in
We further assume that by accepting (K, t e (τ )), the type-τ manager receives exactly his reservation utility, i.e., t e (τ ) = τ K − E(τ ). We will verify later that this is a necessary condition for optimality. Note that we do not exclude the possibilities of α = θ, α = τ , τ = β, or β =θ, which represent respectively the cases when no manager is excluded, only a single internal incentive plan is offered, exactly one type of manager receives the maximum capital, and no manager with a relatively high capital productivity is excluded.
Given all the above assumptions, the owner's problem becomes the following:
In Eq. (3), the first four inequalities are incentive compatibility (IC) conditions: (IC-1) guarantees that a manager that receives an incentive plan specific for himself does not attempt to choose some other incentive plans, (IC-2) ensures that the manager that receives the maximum capital K is willing to accept it, and (IC-3) and (IC-4) are for respectively the manager who is excluded from below and above. The last two inequalities in Eq. condition is automatically satisfied. In the following we first focus on the case when β > θ * and
Our strategy is to first ignore the (IC) and (IR) conditions for the manager whose type falls outside the interval [α, τ ], i.e., (IC-2), (IC-3), (IC-4), and (IR-2), and then verify that they are satisfied under our proposed menu.
For this subproblem, we can replace (IC-1) in (3) by the following local incentive compatibility (LOIC) condition: U ′ e (θ) = I e (θ), θ ∈ [α, τ ), and that I e (θ) is increasing in θ. Note that from the definition of U e (θ), we have t e (θ) = θI e (θ) − U e (θ). Observing that the first term in the objective function in Eq. (3) is independent of the choice of (I e (θ), t e (θ)), ∀θ ∈ [α, τ ), we can ignore it for a moment and solve the optimization problem with respect to {(I e (θ), t e (θ)), θ ∈ [α, τ )}. Replacing The solution to this subproblem can be easily characterized. First choose I e (θ) = E ′ (θ), which is increasing in θ by the convexity of E(θ). Given this level of investment, we can select the promised return t e (θ) so that the manager receives the same utility U e (θ) as from the reservation utility:
Under this menu of incentive plans, the manager's (IR) condition is binding, and therefore this menu achieves the upper bound of the optimization problem (4) and thus is optimal.
Having characterized the optimal menu for the subproblem (4), we now determine the promised return t e (τ ). Note that a jump in the internal capital may occur at θ = τ if E ′ (τ ) < K. However, the received utility should be continuous (otherwise a manager with at θ = τ would deviate to choose another plan that gives him a strictly positive utility). Thus, we have that U e (τ ) = τ K − t e (τ ) = E(τ ) ⇔ t e (τ ) = τ K − E(τ ).
The upper bound β is determined by the minimum ofθ and the solution to the equality βK − (τ K − E(τ )) = E(β), which gives rise to the cutoff type of manager who is indifferent between accepting the internal capital and using the external capital. From the convexity of E(·) and that E ′ (τ ) < K, there exists a unique β for any given K and τ . When E ′ (τ ) = K, [τ, β] degenerates.
We can then verify that all the incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints are satisfied if this proposed menu is used. Since the manager receives a nonnegative payoff, the (IR) condition is automatically satisfied. (IC-1) follows directly from the local incentive compatibility condition. Now consider (IC-2). Given the menu, (IC-2) becomes
Note that U e (θ) ≥ E(θ) from (IR-2). Therefore, since E(θ) ≥ E(z) + (θ − z)E ′ (z), ∀θ, ∀z by the convexity of E(θ), we obtain that
Thus, (IC-2) is settled. Likewise, we can verify (IC-3) and (IC-4) based on the convexity of E(θ).
We now consider the optimal choice of α and τ . The threshold β is determined once we have fixed τ . Let us first determine α, the cutoff threshold from below. The owner is willing to offer internal capital to a manager if and only if it obtains a positive profit from him. When θ ∈ [α, τ ], the owner's net profit from offering to a type-θ manager is t e (θ) − rI e (θ) = (θ − r)E ′ (θ) − E(θ) ≥ 0,
where the left-hand side of the inequality can be shown to be strictly increasing due to the convexity of E(θ). Therefore, there exists a unique threshold θ * * such that (θ * * − r)E ′ (θ * * ) − E(θ * * ) = 0, and at optimality the owner should set α = θ * * . Note that this is independent of the choice of τ .
The choice of τ can then be determined. Given the menu of incentive plans, the owner's expected payoff is as follows:
The optimal can be obtained easily by the first-order condition. Finally, when either θ * * >θ or K < E ′ (θ * * ), the region in which voluntary capital rationing degenerates.
Proof of Proposition 3.
With the opportunity costs, we can rewrite the owner's problem We can then follow the proof of Proposition 1 and find that the optimal hurdle rate is determined by the marginal cost-benefit analysis as follows: (θ−r) 
